The Dangers of Revolution Essay Example

The Dangers of Revolution Essay Example The Dangers of Revolution Essay The Dangers of Revolution Essay Essay Topic: Leviathan After years, indeed decades, of living under the dictatorial rule of President Ben All ordinary citizens took to the streets in protest. In short order, the popular uprising moved into the capital city of Tunis and ultimately forced All from power. Within months the governments of Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria all saw similar uprisings, to varying degrees of success. In the case of Egypt, dictator Embark was ousted but six months later the country still struggles with implementing a new constitution. In Bahrain and Syria government security forces inducted violent crackdowns on dissidents, murdering thousands of their own citizens. In Libya, after months of intense fighting between revolutionary and government forces and the assistance of NATO, the regime of Miramar Quadratic was ousted as well. Dubbed the Arab Spring by Journalists and other observers, the uprisings are undoubtedly a historic event, having unseated, or attempted to unseat, some of the most constant regimes in the region and, indeed, in the world: . Regimes [that have] survived over a period of decades in which democratic waves rolled through East Asia, eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Sahara Africa. 2 In many political and analytical circles around the world the speed, ferocity and contagious nature of the uprising surprised many, leaving world leaders scrambling for a coherent policy. For some, this translated into broad declarations of support for democracy. For others, a more reserved calling for 1 Wrig ht, Robin. July/August 2011. The Arab Spring is a Jobs Crisis. The Atlantic. 58. 2 Game Ill, F. Gregory. July/August 2011. Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring. Foreign Affairs. Volt. 90 (Issue 4). 1. 2 optimistic regarding the chances of democracy taking hold in the aforementioned action-states and spreading to other countries in the region, the reality is quite different. While democracy should be encouraged throughout the world, there should be no misconceptions that democratic rule in every country would benefit the national security of the United States. A number of factors, including the lack of democratic institutions, the strong presence of Islamic fundamentalists, economics and even civilization identity all conspire to pull many states into chaos and propel anti-democratic leaders to power. Moreover, popular uprisings and democratic elections in other Middle Eastern nation-states (namely Iran, Afghanistan and Lebanon) have shown that democracy in the developing world shouldnt be blindly supported. Purpose Statement One of the primary strengths of social science research, particularly in the fields of political science and international relations, is that it excels at explanatory research. That is, looking at past events, determining the why behind a plethora of variables and explaining how those variables impacted the actions and decisions that were made. While this research has aspects of explanatory research, the central thesis is ore predictive in nature in that it is attempting to determine what will or may happen in the future based on current and past events. Admittedly, the latter form is not nearly as strong as the former for a variety of factors including the fact that not all, or even most, of the information is available at the time of writing. For example, the body of academic literature was 3 BBC Monitoring Middle East. May 20, 2011. Reactions to President Beams Middle East Speech. From Lazier. Net. 3 expanded at the end of the Cold War with the demise of the Soviet Union. This occurred because researchers finally had access behind the Iron Curtain to interviews, documents and even the nation itself. Similarly, in a decade, the events surrounding the Arab Spring will likely have far more depth and context that can be accessed in the fall of 2011. Nevertheless, predictive research is vital to the understanding of current events and the world order and in some instances, such as George Seamans Foreign Policy article advocating a policy of containing the Soviet Union, can provide a framework for policy-makers. While goals of this research are not nearly as lofty, it does hope to inform a specific area of international security and offer possible outcomes that other researchers may have missed. Indeed, while some Journalists and editorials have mentioned the possibility that a democratic Middle East could quickly turn against the United States, few academics have considered it. This is at least partially because of the the aforementioned strength of social science research being explanatory. Therefore, this research hopes to inform and enrich the body of literature by determining the possible negative outcomes of the Arab Spring and specifically skiing: What are the transnational and international impacts of the 2011 uprisings, This research will draw from a variety of sources, however, as mentioned above, the body of academic literature on this subject is somewhat thin. While relying on periodicals can prove problematic due to the daily, and sometimes hourly, news cycles, in this instance they will be informative simply because of the lack of other sources. Moreover, in making the argument outlined below, this research will utilize content analysis of periodicals from the late sass and compare the language to similar magazines and newspapers from 2011. The thesis of this research is that the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa will cause long-term instability throughout the region because of civilization clash. For claritys sake, the 2011 uprisings refer to the so-called Arab Spring that began in Tunisia and continues today. 4 Civilization clash, the variable that this paper seeks to argue will cause problems in the region for US national security is derived from Samuel P. Huntington article, later a book, titled The Clash of Civilizations. Written nearly two decades ago, Huntington work is particularly helpful in explaining where potential areas of inflict may be in the future. For the dependent variable, long-term instability, creating a metric to quantify it has proven troublesome. This is because the evidence to fully support the thesis has yet to occur, however, by using the historical example of Iran before and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution this research may be able to predict certain key factors to the stability of a nation. Internally, economic indicators such as unemployment rates, GAP growth, trade balances, population below the poverty line and inflation rates all contribute to the stability of a nation. Additionally, the religious, social and political trustees and the role the military has in internal affairs all play a role. Externally, security agreements and partnerships, refugees and conflicts all work together to strengthen or undermine a country. For the purposes of this research, because developing an accurate index/matrix would be a research project in and of itself, we will utilize the excellent work of Dry. Mayer R. F. AAA-Roadman, Mr.. Hair Balkan and Dry. Garage Herd of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. 4 In the Stability Matrix the researchers take into account a variety of economic, environmental, military and security, political and social factors, assigning each variable a level weighted from one to three: Each factor is given a score of 1-3, where 1 indicates that the factor contributes to stability, 2 indicates that it makes a borderline contribution to stability, and 3 indicates that it contributes to instability. 6 The matrix utilizes indexes from other governmental and non-profit institutions and combines them into a comprehensive database. Some factors listed are beyond the scope of this research, but its application will nonetheless provide clarity 4 Dry. Neff R. F. AAA-Roadman, Mr.. Hair Balkan and Dry. Garage Herd. December 20, 2006. Proposal for a Stability Matrix. Program on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalization and Transnational Security. Geneva Centre f or Security Policy. Http://www. Gasp. Chi/content/download/ matrixpdPDF See Appendix 2, attached as a separate document due to formatting issues. Ibid. 5 and measurement to the issue of instability. Theoretical Framework Just as international law gives policy-makers and lawyers a framework from which to analyze and decide what can be done, International Relations Theory gives the policy- akAkers framework from which they can analyze and decide what should be done. While International Relations Theory includes dozens of competing worldviews, one of the oldest traditions is that of realism. Dating back to ThDuchessesnd his History of the PePeloponnesusar, realism makes several key assumptions about the international order. First, the international system in anarchic. By anarchic, the traditional definition is typically used, that is, in the literal sense of absence of rule, lack of government anAnarchyoes not imply chaos, absence of order; it is simply the bsabsencef hierarchical political order based on formal subordination and authority. 7 Second, realists assume that states are at the center of the international order. This means that states are the primary actors in the world: states go to war with one another, states sign treaties with one another, states trade with one another. A chief criticism of realism has been its inability to factor noonstagend non-governmental organizations into the equation. Realists typically respond that NGNagstill lack the power and the abilities of states. 8 Although, in the 21st century, this response can, at immimesignore the realities of the world. Third, the principal concern of a state is its own security and survival. 9 Because the international system lacks a leviathan, states are on their own to develop a military, an economy, a 7 Jack Donnelly. Realism and International Relations. (Cambridge press: New York, 2000): 10. Ibid: 7-8. 9 Ibid: 7-8. 6 political and social structure. All of which are threatened by other nation-states who are invariably interested in expanding their own power. Therefore, realists typically place hard power, that is military strength, above soft power issues of economics ndNDolitical influence. Fourth, drawing from the third point, power relations are a fundamental feature of international affair s. 10 As mentioned above, states view the surest way to ensure its own survival is to expand its power. Typically, expanding power results in war. While there are additional criteria that various scholars add to realist theory, these four are the most common assumptions that form the core of the theory. Drawing from these assumptions, this research will expand the definition of realism to include non-governmental organizations. This is because, while realism is exceptionally well- uitiedo explain the behavior of and interactions between nation-states, it tends to have difficulty understanding non-state actors. However, if we treat such actors and strategies many of the realist assumptions about the world still line up. More difficult still is the inclusion and application of Samuel P. HuHuntingtonheory of the Clash of Civilizations. First postulated in a Foreign Affairs article in 1993, and later in a 1996 book, HuHuntingtonheory was hailed as asasnnovative as George KeSeamansontainment theory, and derided as racist and xenophobic. Despite the criticism evevolvedgainst it, the theory is included for two reasons: First, in the eighteen years since its publication, the Clash of Civilizations has shown itself to effectively explain, at least in broad strokes, the world of the 21st century. Second, and even more importantly, it is a theory that, if not by name then by attributes, is frequently quoted by A1AAAaeda and other IsPsalmistss a call to arms for its supporters. 11 Therefore, this research would be remiss to simply ignore HuHuntingtonork. 10 Ibid: 7. 11 CiCoevalCarl J. 2009. The Contours of A1AAAaQaedaedia Strategy. Studies in conflict -reremainsvoVolt2: 853875. 7 At the core of the The Clash of Civilizations is the desire to examine the short- comings of past theories in explaining the post-1990 world and define a new paradigm for international relations. Huntington begins by outlining four possible worlds in which one could find themselves. The first, deemed One World: Euphoria and Harmony12 directly responds to Francis FuFuchsiashe End of History which asserts, among other things, that we may be witnessing ththend of history as such: that is, the end point of mankinds ideological evolution and the ununiversalisticf Western liberal democracy as the final form of government. 13 Ultimately, watching the genocide and cultural conflict that persisted throughout the 19sassHuntington concluded that this world paradigm was simply too divorced from reality. 4 The second paradigm Huntington considers is Two Worlds: Us and Them. 15 This paradigm permeates the majority of human conflict, from the Cold War to the Ancient Greeks, East versus West, Global North versus Global South, Core versus Periphery, it is simple and direct, but in the end is too simplistic to explain an increasingly complex international order. 16 The third paradigm is what Huntington calls 184 states, more or less. 17 Essentially an update of classic realism, this piPicturef the world is a highly useful starting point for analyzing international affairs and explains much state behavior. States are and will remain the dominant entities in world affairs . ovOverallhis stassistaradigm does provide a more realistic picture of and guide to global politics than the one- or two-world paradigms. 18 However, according to Huntington, states are gradually losing power and sovereignty to non- state institutions and actors. The last paradigm is Sheer Chaos19 and is characterized by failed states, massive refugee and humanitarian crises and the prbreadf terrorism. While there certainly are areas of the world that match this description, adopting this as a paradigm 12 Huntington Samuel P. 996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. Simon Schuster: New York, New York: 31 . 13 Ibid. 31. 15 Ibid. 32 16 Ibid. 33 17 Ibid. 33 18 Ibid. 34 19 Ibid. 35 8 offer little to no explanation on insight into the future. 20 Thus, Huntington concludes that a new approach, a new way in which to view the world is needed. Rejecting the overly simplistic and the overly complex, he aims for something of a middle path, a allanceetween reality and parsimony. 21 Creating a cicivilizationodel, Huntington divides the world into nine civilizations. For the cicivilizationpproach, there are four key assumptions: The forces of integration in the world are real and are precisely what are generating cocounterforcef cultural assertion and cicivilizationonsciousness. The world is in some sense two, but the central distinction is between the West as the hitherto dominant civilization and all the other, which, however, have little if anything in common among them. The world, in short, is divided between a Western one and a onmonoesterany. Nation states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and cicivilizationactors. The world is indeed anarchical, rife with tribal and nationality conflicts, but the conflicts that pose the greatest dangers for stability are those between states or groups from different civilizations. 22 Huntington identifies nine distinct civilizations: Western, Orthodox, Islamic, African, Latin American, SiSonicChinese), Hindu, Buddhist, and Japanese, and lays out a new map of the world. While clearly each civilization has overlap within certain areas and nation-states, and each civilization is far from hohomogeneousithin the defined regions, HuHuntingtonap provides some insight to the cicivilizationaradigm: 20 Ibid. 36. 21 Ibid. 37. 22 Ibid. 36 9 Figure 1 The World of Civilizations: Post-1990 Moreover, because of the increasingly glglobalizesorld, civilizations are coming into contact more and more often which only highlights the differences in culture, language and religion. Upon publication, HuHuntingtonssay created a firestorm of controversy. While considering even a few perspectives that counter the core thesis ouloude a research project in and of itself, it is still useful to understand and rebut some of the criticism. In particular, many academics have criticized HuHuntingtonheory by citing specific examples in the post-Cold War and post-WI 1 period that show the cicivilizationpproach is too simplistic. Their argument is that it fails to take into account clashes within civilizations which, in the case of the RwRwandaenocide, is even deadlier than supposed cicivilizationlashes. Robert Kaplan, a correspondent for Atlantic Monthly and author of several books on, as he calls it, the roreentersf civilization, argues because HuHuntingtonrush is broad, his specifics are vulnerable to attack. 24 He goes on to outline a direct rebuttal put forth by a Johns 23 Ibid: 26-27. 24 Robert Kaplan. February 1994. The Coming Anarchy. In The Coming Anarchy. 2000. Vintage Books, New York. 27. 10 Hopkins professor: The world of Islam divides and subdivides. The battle lines in the Caucasus arAreot coextensive with cicivilizationault lines. The lines follow the interests of states. Where Huntington sees a cicivilizationuel between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Iranian state has cast religious zeal . o Ohe wind . inInhat battle the Iranians have tilted toward Christen Armenia. 25 Kaplan notes that while the professor is correct in his facts, HuHuntingtonheory still holds up because the AzGazerssecular ShShihsview their cultural identity as Turkish. The ArArmeniansimilarly, are not battling the AzGazersecause of religious affiliation but rather because they are Turks, related to the same Turks that massacred ArArmeniann 1915. 26 Additionally, throughout the region TuTurkeyulture is battling Iranian culture, therefore the Iranians and the ArArmenianave a natural enemy in the Turks. 7 Perhaps most interestingly, however, is that the world described by the Johns Hopkins professor is even more dangerous than the one Huntington envisions. 28 While this is but one specific example, this attack is repeated throughout the academic literature. In most instances an analysis such a KaKaplaneveals a world that still supports HuHuntingtonicivilizationheory. The other main charge leveled against this theory is that it fundamentally misunderstands Islamic, SiSonicnd other cultures, in particular citing HuHuntingtonlaims that the failure of Western liberal democracy to take hold in Muslim societies has its source at least in part in the inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberal concepts. 29 Some commentators have argued that the Arab Spring proves cicivilizationheory wrong, particularly that many people in Arab nations do share a universal hunger for liberty. They feel the presence of universal human rights and feel insulted when they are not accorded them. 30 Two points: first, in fairness to Huntington he never claimed that people in 26 27 28 29 Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Huntington. 116. David Brooks. March 4, 2011. HuHuntingtonlash Revisited. New York Times. 27. 11 Muslim nations have been characterized by autocratic leaders and IsSalamisovements. Second, it is still too early in the revolutionary process to make claims that liberty (especially as Westerners understand it) will prevail over a different kind of autocracy in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other countries. A far more likely outcome, as Huntington explains, is that these nation-states will adopt certain aspects of liberal democracy but also incorporate their own culture in their electoral and governing processes. This will be expanded upon later in the research. The inclusion of ivvolitionalheory in this research could be understandably interpreted as a misunderstanding of what Huntington sought to accomplish: that is, an alternative explanation to the theories of realism, idealism and others. Instead, its inclusion is actually explained in part by Huntington himself. Huntington agreed with two realist core assumptions: that the world is anarchical and that nation-states are its primary actors. In this authors mind, cicivilizationheory is best understood as a subset of so-called complex realism which recognizes and attempts to correct realisms short- omominousith the inclusion of additional theories. Therefore, complex realism is best understood as having realist assumptions, but recognizing that NGNagsuch as terrorist organizations play a vital role in determining the security of a nation-state and that conflicts, while between states or non-state actors, are, on a systemic level, often between civilizations. Background and Analysis On December 17, 2010 few analysts or policy-makers would have predicted that the suicide of a young man in North Africa would cause one of the greatest uprisings since the end of the Cold War.